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I. INTRODUCTION 
Brédjing is a Chadian town near the Chad-Sudan border; it is also the name of 
a near-by refugee camp operated by the International Federation of the Red Cross.1 
The denizens of the camp are the men and women, young and old, who were forced 
from their Sudanese homes in the Darfur region.2 For years, paramilitary forces 
backed by the Sudanese national government in Khartoum pillaged and ransacked 
the refugees’ former towns and villages.3 The best hope for these civilians to 
escape the persecution of their own government was to flee into neighboring Chad. 
Life, as in any refugee camp, is dangerous; the refugees are the targets of 
bandits and rebels, and they suffer illness and instability.4 However, life within the 
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1 Chad: Annual Report, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES 3 
(Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/annual09/MAATD00109ar.pdf [hereinafter IFRC 
REPORT]. 
2 Id. 
3 Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to the United 
Nations Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005). 
4 IRC Provides Essential Healthcare for Darfuri Refugees in Eastern Chad, RELIEFWEB (Nov. 7, 
2008), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ MCOT-7L6DLP?OpenDocument. 
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boundaries of the camp at Brédjing is in many ways better than the violence and 
insecurity they left behind. In the camp, the international community provides a 
stable source of nutrition and potable water. Shelter, basic infrastructure, and 
services such as medical care and education are also available.5 Perhaps most 
importantly the refugees are beyond the reach of the government that has 
perpetuated the persecution. Additionally, these individuals either have already 
sought, or are permitted to seek, legal refugee status with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees.6 
The total number of refugees from Darfur in 2009 lay somewhere near 
268,000.7 In contrast, estimates from the following year on the number of Darfuri 
internally displaced people (IDPs) ranged from 1.9 to 2.7 million.8 IDPs often 
suffer persecution, violence, and instability similar to that of refugees, but have not 
left their home country. Unfortunately, not only do many IDPs lack the assistance 
and physical security of coordinated international relief available in camps like 
Brédjing, they also are excluded from the legal benefits intrinsic in refugee status.9 
The reason for this exclusion lies within the particular language of the legal 
definition of refugee. Current international and domestic law differentiates these 
similarly at-risk populations by their geographic location.10 Specifically, a person 
must be outside of his or her home country to qualify as a refugee.11 This 
requirement, the “alienage” or “territoriality” element, is enshrined in the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention).12 
The United States has sought to circumvent the alienage requirement of 
refugeehood through domestic legislation. The Refugee Act of 1980, currently a 
                                                          
 
5 IFRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. 
6 See, e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 15-16, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 (Jan. 1992). 
7 Sudan—Complex Emergency: Situation Report #10, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/sudan/template/f
s_sr/fy2010/sudan_ce_fs10_8-20-2010.pdf. 
8 Id. 
9 See infra Part II(A)2(a). 
10 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2), Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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part of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42)(B),13 provides the 
President the authority to choose when and where this territorial element of the 
international refugee definition applies. 
This article will explore the most pressing question regarding the Refugee 
Convention’s alienage requirement, namely whether it is merely a baseline from 
which parties may expand protections to include internally displaced groups which 
otherwise fit the refugee requirements. Or, alternatively, is the alienage 
requirement an essential element of the Convention, a non-derogable limit on who 
may be considered a refugee? If the latter is correct, then what restrictions does the 
alienage stipulation place on the capacity of the United States to expand refugee 
protections to internal refugees as provided for under INA § 101(a)(42)(B) 
(hereinafter “alienage exception law” or “(42)(B)”)? 
This paper argues that the alienage exception law as it is executed by the 
President often, but not in every instance, violates international law. The United 
States, as a signatory to the Refugee Convention,14 is beholden to the terms of that 
document, including the Convention’s definition of refugee. Where the language of 
(42)(B) seemingly permits the President to grant refugee status to individuals who 
still reside in their home country, this paper asserts that alienage is mandated by the 
Refugee Convention and the principle of non-intervention. Therefore, the U.S., in 
order to comply with its own obligations and to comport with international law and 
the rights of fellow sovereign states, must fundamentally change the means of 
providing assistance to internally displaced populations. 
This article will lay out the argument in several steps. In Part II, it provides a 
brief clarification of terms followed by a short history of the Refugee Convention’s 
drafting after World War II up to its incorporation in domestic law through the 
Refugee Act of 1980. Part III presents the bulk of the argument. First, this section 
discusses the nature of non-intervention and its constraints on refugeehood. 
Specifically, it argues that non-intervention has long mandated a blanket 
prohibition against the application of refugee status to IDPs. Second, the section 
examines whether the Refugee Convention permits any deviations from the non-
intervention principle as it applies to refugee status, including whether it contains a 
                                                          
 
13 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006). 
14 As a technical matter, it bears mention that the United States never signed the original Refugee 
Convention. However, the U.S. is a signatory to the 1967 Protocol, which incorporates the structure of 
the 1951 Convention. Therefore, the U.S. is bound to the terms of the Refugee Convention as amended 
by the Protocol. See States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol, UNHCR (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf. 
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legal basis for the application of (42)(B). In this context, the language of the 
Convention will be analyzed and interpreted along with an examination of the 
legislative history, intent of the drafters, and the meaning of the Convention as it 
was understood by those countries who signed onto it. Part III concludes that the 
Refugee Convention does not establish an exception to non-intervention. 
Part IV proposes several options to remedy this problem. Specifically, the 
U.S. can alter its application of the alienage exception law to comport with 
international law, or it can seek a new international agreement which allows for 
intervention on behalf of internal refugees. In addition, this section briefly explores 
the utility of the emerging field of human security as a potential avenue for 
addressing IDP issues within the framework of international law. 
II. DEFINING AND DISCRIMINATING REFUGEES FROM OTHER 
PERSECUTED GROUPS 
A. Refugees, IDPs & Internal Refugees 
In common parlance the term “refugee” has been used to describe any person 
who was forced to flee home in fear. For instance, the Wall Street Journal 
described the victims of the 2010 Haiti earthquake as refugees even though these 
individuals in no way fit the international legal definition.15 In relevant part, the 
Refugee Convention defines a refugee as any individual who “owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country.”16 This definition establishes four requirements 
for refugee status: a well-founded fear of persecution; persecution based on one of 
the enumerated motives; alienage (the person is outside of his or her home 
country); and an unwillingness to return home due to such fear. Therefore, civilians 
who flee into a neighboring country on account of natural disaster, famine, 
economic destitution, or similar reasons are not properly understood as refugees in 
the legal sense. Similarly, individuals who are persecuted for precisely one of the 
enumerated motives but by force or choice remain within their home country also 
are not defined as refugees. 
                                                          
 
15 Christopher Rhoads, Refugees Flee to Remote Village, Find Same Problems, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704320104575015583574736678.html. 
16 Refugee Convention, supra note 10. 
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The term “internally displaced persons” lacks an agreed-upon legal definition. 
However, it has been widely adopted to describe all civilians who were forced to 
flee their homes out of fear for their safety or well-being but who have not left their 
home country.17 It is important to note that this definition could include many 
displaced people who do not face persecution. Therefore, it is incorrect to think of 
all IDPs simply as refugees who have not fled their home country. For purposes of 
this paper, the narrower term “internal refugees” signifies precisely that population 
who would be refugees but for a failure to meet the alienage requirement. In other 
words, all internal refugees are IDPs, but not all IDPs are internal refugees. 
There is no lack of interest or concern for IDPs in the international 
community; indeed, many African states have signed on to what is, in effect, an 
IDP Convention to address their plight.18 Yet, while there is a growing awareness 
and effort on behalf of these victimized populations, they do not receive nearly the 
same legal, physical, or social provisions as are provided to refugees. 
Despite the similarity of conditions for IDPs and refugees, the difference in 
treatment they are guaranteed under international and domestic U.S. law is vast. 
Under the Convention, refugees are afforded rights including “wage-earning 
employment.”19 They are also guaranteed access to social security20 and public aid, 
such that they receive “the same treatment with respect to public relief and 
assistance as is accorded to [the host state’s] nationals.”21 Yet, perhaps the greatest 
benefit provided to refugees is the promise of non-refoulement. This right is laid 
out in Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention, mandating that “[n]o Contracting State 
shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
                                                          
 
17 See REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
Comm. on Human Rights, 54th Sess., U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) (by Francis M. 
Deng) (defining IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to 
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or 
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border”). 
18 See, e.g., The African Union IDPs Convention: A Unique Opportunity to Strengthen the Protection of 
the Internally Displaced in Africa, FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DES LIGUES DES DROITS DE 
L’HOMME (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.fidh.org/The-African-Union-IDPs-Convention. 
19 Refugee Convention, supra note 10, at art. 17. 
20 Id. at art. 24. 
21 Id. at art. 23. 
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political opinion.”22 This doctrine has been described by the UNHCR as “the 
cornerstone of international refugee protection.”23 
In addition to these international guarantees, refugees in the United States are 
provided notable immigration benefits. Refugees are eligible to adjust their status 
to that of a permanent resident and obtain a green card after one year.24 Their 
immediate family members may also enter the U.S. with derivative refugee status.25 
Moreover, volunteer organizations within the U.S. which assist the refugee’s 
transition to their new home “arrange for food, housing, clothing, employment, 
counseling, medical care, and other necessary services.”26 It is clear then that there 
are tangible and critical benefits incumbent in legal refugee status. 
From a purely humanitarian or moral position, if two innocent civilians are 
hunted by the same murderous regime, it seems absurd that the sole distinction of 
perhaps fifty yards of physical space should determine legal protection or legal 
vulnerability, life or death. With the contrast between the tremendous support 
offered to refugees and the relatively non-existent legal protection for internal 
refugees or IDPs, it is no wonder that some authors have sought to diminish the 
role of alienage in the Refugee Convention and international law.27 
B. 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol 
The Refugee Convention was the product of negotiations following World 
War II.28 Prior to that war, the international community addressed refugee flows in 
an ad hoc fashion; specific and identifiable ethnic groups such as Armenians would 
be the subject of refugee agreements and organizations.29 After the war, the United 
Nations sought to alleviate the plight of the uncounted masses of displaced people 
                                                          
 
22 Id. at art. 33. 
23 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-
Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol, ¶ 5, (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45f17a1a4.html. 
24 Post Arrival Assistance and Benefits, REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, http://www.rcusa.org/index.php?page 
=post-arrival-assistance-and-benefits (last visited June 29, 2012). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Luke T. Lee, Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Toward a Legal Synthesis?, 9 J. 
REFUGEE STUD. 27, 38–39 (1996). 
28 See Kristen Walker, Defending the 1951 Convention Definition of Refugee, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 583, 
587–97 (2003) (providing a thorough recounting of the history of the 1951 Refugee Convention). 
29 Id. at 587. 
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through a new mechanism which would define refugee status based on the 
individual’s situation.30 After its drafting in the late 1940s and 1950, the proposed 
Convention on the Status of Refugees was reviewed by the U.N. Economic and 
Social Council and later the General Assembly.31 This document would become the 
1951 Refugee Convention.32 
The Protocol to the Refugee Convention was established in 1967.33 The 
original Refugee Convention definition placed temporal restrictions on 
refugeehood such that it applied only to “events occurring before 1 January 
1951.”34 The Protocol eliminated this stipulation.35 Thus, joining the Protocol has 
the same legal effect as signing the Convention itself. To date, 141 countries are 
signatories to both the Convention and the Protocol. A few countries, including the 
United States, are only signatories to the Protocol.36 
C. The Refugee Act of 198037 
In the U.S., the domestic implementation of the Refugee Convention came 
about in the Refugee Act of 1980.38 This legislation established the U.S. definition 
of a refugee.39 Although the full Convention definition is included, the Refugee Act 
definition also includes more expansive language. Specifically, under (42)(B), the 
President has the authority to extend refugee status to individuals who still reside in 
their home country.40 The Act provides that the refugee definition may be 
expanded to include: 
                                                          
 
30 Id. at 589–90. 
31 Id. at 591. 
32 Id. at 592. 
33 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1(2), 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 
Protocol]. 
34 Refugee Convention, supra note 10. 
35 Protocol, supra note 33. 
36 U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES, GLOBAL REPORT 2007: MAP-PARTIES TO THE 1951 
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL, at 145 (2008) 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4848f6072.pdf#zoom=66. 
37 See Susan Raufer, In-Country Processing of Refugees, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 241–45 (1995) 
(providing a thorough examination of the history of the Refugee Act of 1980). 
38 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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In such special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation . . . 
may specify, any person who is within the country of such person’s nationality 
[and] who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.41 
This power is exercised yearly in a Presidential Determination (PD). The White 
House issues a PD which specifies the number of refugees to be admitted to the 
United States that year and which countries’ citizens will be admitted. Often, when 
identifying potential refugees, the PD disregards the alienage requirement, allowing 
IDPs to seek asylum in the U.S. as well. For example, the 2010 PD permitted the 
admission of 80,000 “refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United 
States.”42 It also stated that the citizens of Cuba, Iraq, the former Soviet States, and 
people “in exceptional circumstances” in any country “be considered refugees for 
the purpose of admission to the United States within their countries of nationality 
or habitual residence.”43 Until as recently as 2009, citizens of Vietnam were also 
included in the (42)(B) category.44 
The language of the statute was the product of negotiations between Senate 
and House bills that eventually become the Refugee Act.45 The Senate version, 
influenced largely by the late Senator Edward Kennedy, sought a far more 
expansive definition of “refugee” than was required by the Convention.46 In 
addition to the standard Convention definition, the Senate bill also sought to cover 
“persons displaced in their own country by military or civil disturbances, or 
                                                          
 
41 Id. (emphasis added). 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (2006) (defines “appropriate consultation” as, “discussions 
in person by designated Cabinet-level representatives of the President with members of the Committees 
on the Judiciary of the Senate and of the House of Representatives to review the refugee situation or 
emergency refugee situation, to project the extent of possible participation of the United States therein, 
to discuss reasons for believing that the proposed admission of refugees is justified by humanitarian 
concerns or grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest, and to provide such 
members with the following information: [nature of the refugee situation; number of refugees; plans for 
resettlement; social, economic and demographic impact on the US; extent of other countries 
involvement; impact on foreign policy; any other appropriate information]”). 
42 Presidential Determination No. 2011-02, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,851–52 (Oct. 8, 2010). 
43 Id. 
44 Presidential Determination No. 2008-29, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,865–66 (Sept. 30, 2008). 
45 Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 141, 143–45 (1981). 
46 Id. at 149. 
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uprooted by arbitrary detention.”47 In effect, this definition would have entirely 
eliminated the alienage element found in the Convention.48 While this provision 
was not included in the final bill, it is evidence of the intent of some drafters when 
they crafted the Refugee Act. Specifically, influential members within the United 
States Congress sought to craft a legal basis for providing refugee status to IDPs 
even though the Convention seemingly mandated alienage. 
Without claiming to know what motivations the President has for including 
certain countries on the PD, the obvious correlation between the U.S. and (42)(B) 
states is that they have all been, at one point, tied intricately to U.S. foreign policy. 
The governments of the former Soviet states,49 and communist forces in Vietnam50 
and Cuba,51 have been perceived as antagonists to the United States’ foreign policy 
goals. As such, the identification and welcoming of refugees from those countries 
was a clear philosophical and doctrinal victory for the non-Communist bloc and the 
U.S. in particular.52 Strangely, this second characteristic does not apply to Iraq; 
when Iraq was added to the PD list in 2009 the Iraqi government was ostensibly a 
U.S. ally, one which it had a great deal of interest in promoting as stable and 
legitimate.53 Here it is plausible that the Iraqi government supports this U.S. 
immigration policy as a means to either protect its citizens from hostile groups 
within Iraq or to reduce the size of a massive IDP population, estimated in 2009 to 
be over 1.5 million.54 Of course, this is only speculation. In any event, regardless of 
                                                          
 
47 Id. 
48 See S. 3202/H.R. 15093, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 6(a)(7)(B) (1969) (defining a refugee as “any alien 
who has fled or shall flee from and is unwilling to return to any country”). 
49 Since as early as 1946, U.S. officials have regarded the Soviet Union as a hostile international actor. 
See, e.g., George Kennan, Long Telegram (Feb. 22, 1946), available at http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm (telegram from George Kennan, the American 
charge d’affaires in Moscow, to James Byrnes, Secretary of State). 
50 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (providing President Lyndon Johnson 
authority to engage Communist forces in Vietnam by taking “all necessary measures to repeal any 
armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression”). 
51 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 6002 (2006) (“It should be the policy of the United States . . . to seek a peaceful 
transition to democracy and a resumption of economic growth in Cuba through the careful application of 
sanctions directed at the Castro government and support for the Cuban people . . . .”). 
52 See Raufer, supra note 37, at 234–35. 
53 See Presidential Determination No. 2009-32, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,385, 52,386 (Sept. 30, 2009). 
54 U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES, GLOBAL REPORT 2009: IRAQ SITUATION, at 171 (2009), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4c09f25e9.pdf. 
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the motivations behind it, numerous presidents over decades have shown a 
willingness to utilize the powers provided by (42)(B). 
While the intent behind Refugee Act definition may be humanitarian in 
nature, Congress has arguably changed the fundamental nature of what it means to 
be a refugee. They have taken a strict and clear element of the 1951 Convention 
and cast it aside. 
III. 101(A)(42)(B) AND THE CONSTRAINTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
This article does not contest the domestic validity of (42)(B) as passed by 
Congress. It is valid in the sense that it was properly established as law within the 
United States. The question at hand is whether the language of the statute runs 
afoul of international law and the Refugee Convention on its own terms or in its 
application, and if so, under what circumstances. 
While many aspects of the refugee definition have been debated, the territorial 
requirement has largely been ignored. Perhaps this is because it appears to be, 
relative to the other elements, clear and objective. The Council of Europe’s Human 
Rights Education Associates explains bluntly “applicants for refugee status must be 
outside the country of their nationality. They must have crossed an international 
border. If they have not, they do not qualify for protection under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.”55 Scholars have also touched only briefly on this topic; James 
Hathaway has stated: 
[M]any if not most of the persons forced to flee their homes in search of safety 
remain within the boundaries of their state. Their plight may be every bit as 
serious as that of individuals who cross borders, yet the Convention definition of 
refugee status excludes internal refugees from the scope of global protection.56 
Few things in law, particularly international law, are so seemingly cut and 
dried: a person either is or is not outside of their home country. However, digging 
deeper one finds that the purpose, role, and reach of this language leave many 
questions unanswered. 
                                                          
 
55 Tutorials: The Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons, HUM. RTS. EDUC. ASSOCIATES, 
https://hrea.org/learn/tutorials/refugees/page11.html (last visited July 1, 2012). 
56 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 29 (1991). 
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A. The Scope of International Law and the Right to Non-
Intervention 
Before delving into a discussion about the language of the Refugee 
Convention’s definition, it is necessary to explain the environment in which it 
exists. In broad terms, every nation has the right to state sovereignty and the right 
to conduct internal affairs without intervention from external actors.57 Specifically, 
the international law principle of non-intervention as an element of state 
sovereignty has a tremendous bearing on the role and limits of the Refugee 
Convention and refugee status generally.58 The argument has been presented that 
“the historical importance of the border-crossing element is imposed by what 
remain the cardinal principles of international law, namely, state sovereignty [and] 
non-intervention.”59 At the most basic level, this proposition asserts that refugee 
status and the benefits incumbent in that status cannot be extended to IDP 
populations because to do so would be a violation of non-intervention. 
A skeptic to the argument above would rightly require a more precise 
explanation of what constitutes “intervention.” A survey of the literature makes 
plain that a proper definition of non-intervention remains elusive. In its most 
popular modern incarnation, the UN Charter recognizes the “sovereign equality of 
all its Members”60 stating that it is inappropriate to “intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”61 The General Assembly 
has reaffirmed this rather unhelpful definition of non-intervention, calling it a “duty 
not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.”62 
                                                          
 
57 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 1, 7. 
58 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, International Protection and Assistance for Refugees and the Displaced, 
UNHCR, 7 (Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/47e8d2a82.pdf (“In the case of refugees, the fact of 
having crossed a frontier brings their situation clearly onto the international plane, triggering a raft of 
rules, practices, expectations, institutional mechanisms, and legal tools. On the other hand and as a 
matter of international law, primary responsibility for the protection of and assistance to internally 
displaced persons rests with the territorial State, in virtue of its sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention.”). 
59 CATHERINE PHUONG, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 24 
(James Crawford et al. eds., 2004). 
60 UN Charter art. 2, ¶ 1. 
61 Id. at art. 2, ¶ 7. 
62 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. 
GAOR, 25th Sess. Supp. No. 18, U.N. DOC. A/8018, at 122 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
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If the UN has been unable to provide a clear written definition of non-
intervention, it does at least provide some guidance in its application. The UN has 
applied the principle of non-intervention broadly, evidenced by the international 
community’s recognition of very few exceptions. Specifically, the only widely-
accepted actions excluded from the non-intervention principle are: actions taken 
with the consent of the offended state; self-defense on the part of the intervening 
state; or Security Council sanctioned actions.63 Yet for all this, what is and is not 
intervention is still far from clear. 
R.J. Vincent, in his seminal work on this matter, Nonintervention and 
International Order, sought to break down “intervention” into its component 
parts.64 This was done in the hopes that by examining the elements individually, a 
sort of checklist could be constructed to help identify intervening conduct by a 
foreign state.65 Vincent cataloged six elements which comprised intervention. His 
rubric considers: the “actor that embarks upon intervention, the target that suffers 
[intervention], the activity of intervention itself, the types of intervention, the 
purposes of the activity, and the context in which it takes place.”66 Within this 
framework, analyzing the expansion of refugee protection to internal populations 
may help to clarify whether it can be understood as “intervention” in violation of 
international law.67 
Under Vincent’s framework, the first step is to identify the actor who is 
potentially violating national sovereignty.68 This element is important in many 
cases because there is a dispute as to whether rebel groups, corporations, NGOs, or 
even private citizens can violate international law and the principle of non-
intervention. For purposes of the current analysis however, this element is rather 
simple.69 The exercise of (42)(B) is clearly undertaken by the U.S. every year with 
the issuance of the Presidential Determination document. There is no dispute that 
                                                          
 
63 Peter Stockburger, U.S. Immigration Detention: Policy and Procedure from a Human Rights 
Perspective, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 365, 368 (2010). 
64 R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 3 (1974). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 4. 
69 Id. 
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states are capable of violating international law and non-intervention.70 Therefore, 
this first element is met. 
The second element in the rubric examines the target or beneficiary of the 
potential intervention; it attempts to define “matters . . . within the domestic 
jurisdiction” of States as the UN uses the term.71 Recall that in the case of (42)(B), 
the target is the victim of persecution who still resides within his or her home 
country.72 Vincent proposes that foreign actions affecting “matters concerning 
individuals within the jurisdiction of a state” run afoul of the principle of non-
intervention.73 Vincent is not alone in this assessment; along with Dr. Guy 
Goodwin-Gill,74 James Hathaway has argued that “any attempt to respond to the 
needs of internal refugees would constitute an infringement of the national 
sovereignty of the state within which the refugee resided.”75 The basis of this 
contention is that IDPs are geographically and legally within the confines of their 
home state. Thus, their status and condition remain solely within the domestic 
jurisdiction of that state.76 
The third and fourth elements are somewhat similar to each other in that they 
attempt to identify what types of action can be classified as intervention.77 
According to Vincent, the activity of intervention encompasses actions as invasive 
as military invasion to those as “apparently insignificant as an ill-chosen remark 
made by a statesman about the affairs of a foreign state.”78 For instance, 
intervention may occur if one country lends moral support to anti-government 
groups within another state.79 As (42)(B) expands refugee protections to internal 
populations, it intrinsically presents a judgment of the foreign state’s actions 
toward its own citizens. This judgment is made in the most literal sense: a U.S. 
                                                          
 
70 See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 1 (2001). 
71 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. 
72 See supra Part II(C). 
73 VINCENT, supra note 64, at 6 (quoting QUINCY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS 63 (1960)) (emphasis added). 
74 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 58. 
75 HATHAWAY, supra note 56, at 31. 
76 See PHUONG, supra note 59, at 23–24. 
77 VINCENT, supra note 64, at 10–13. 
78 Id. at 3. 
79 Id. at 10. 
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official must cast judgment on the actions of the refugee’s persecutor, the foreign 
government.80 Further, even in the absence of an actual refugee determination, the 
mere inclusion onto the PD inherently casts aspersions on that state. This act 
singles a country out as one whose domestic affairs are worthy of special treatment 
and provides material and moral support to groups within that state. 
The fifth element of the paradigm focuses on the intervening state’s 
intentions––“the end toward which [the intervention] is directed, that which it is 
designed to achieve.”81 Yet, Vincent hesitates to provide a strict definition of intent 
for two familiar reasons. First, there are almost always multiple reasons for the 
actions of a state. It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty why a group of 
policy makers has ultimately chosen a particular course of action.82 Second, even if 
a government proposes a singular motive, it is difficult to ensure the veracity of 
such a statement.83 Still, with due consideration to the difficulties just presented; 
where intent can be identified it is extremely relevant to whether state action 
constitutes intervention. In the case of the alienage exception law, the political 
motives behind its application appear rather conspicuous. 
The main historical focus of (42)(B) relief has been on antagonists to U.S. 
foreign policy, namely the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Vietnam.84 Despite atrocities 
and persecution occurring in places such as Saudi Arabia85 or former President 
Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt86 these friendly countries have never made it onto a 
                                                          
 
80 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427–28 (1987) (stating “eligibility for asylum 
depends entirely on the Attorney General’s determination that an alien is a “refugee,” as that term is 
defined in § 101(a)(42) . . . .”). 
81 VINCENT, supra note 64, at 10. 
82 Id. at 12. 
83 Id. 
84 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
85 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT: SAUDI ARABIA (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 
2008/nea/119126.htm (“During the year the following significant human rights problems were reported: 
no right to change the government peacefully; beatings; judicially sanctioned corporal punishment; 
impunity, particularly on the part of the religious police; denial of public trials and lack of due process 
in the judicial system; political prisoners; incommunicado detention; restrictions on civil liberties such 
as freedoms of speech (including the Internet), assembly, association, movement, and severe restrictions 
on religious freedom; corruption; and lack of government transparency. Violence against women and 
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, sect, and ethnicity were common.”). 
86 See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT: EGYPT (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/ 
nea/136067.htm (“The [Egyptian] government’s respect for human rights remained poor, and serious 
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presidential determination. One possible reason is that political considerations, at 
the very least, influence decisions to include or exclude certain countries on the 
PD. If this is the case, the application of the alienage exclusion law may be 
properly understood as an attempt to intervene purposefully in the domestic affairs 
of a foreign state for political reasons. While this is not to say that the U.S. has not 
had concomitant humanitarian motives as well, it certainly does not appear as 
though humanitarianism has been the sole, or even the determinative, factor. 
The final element of Vincent’s model is the context in which the intervention 
takes place. However, Vincent finds that while context is always present in 
international affairs, it is “not [a factor] germane to the task of defining 
intervention.”87 On Vincent’s advice, this article will not delve into this element of 
his framework. 
Employing Vincent’s analysis, there exists a logical argument that the 
application of refugee protection to internal groups is a violation of non-
intervention. Accepting this point, if only for the sake of argument, a critical matter 
remains which may render the non-intervention issue moot. Specifically, it must be 
considered whether the Refugee Convention allows for states to expand the refugee 
definition to citizens within their home country. Put another way, have the 
signatories to the Refugee Convention signed away their right to non-intervention 
on this point? The following section concludes that the signatory states have not 
ceded this right. 
B. The Scope of the Convention: Interpretation & Intent 
The language of the 1951 Convention states that a refugee “is outside the 
country of his nationality.”88 However, it does not go on to clarify whether this is a 
limit beyond which states may not expand protections to IDPs without violating 
state sovereignty and non-intervention. In an effort to clarify this point, this section 
begins with an examination of the Convention language itself. It identifies an 
instructive, though not definitive, answer to whether states have surrendered their 
right to non-intervention as it regards internal refugees. Subsequently, this section 
explores the legislative history of the Convention’s drafting. Here it becomes clear 
                                                                                                                                      
 
abuses continued in many areas. . . . Security forces used unwarranted lethal force and tortured and 
abused prisoners and detainees, in most cases with impunity. Prison and detention center conditions 
were poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals, in some cases for political 
purposes, and kept them in prolonged pretrial detention.”). 
87 VINCENT, supra note 64, at 13. 
88 Refugee Convention, supra note 10. 
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that the Convention signatories did not intend to include internal refugees within 
the definition of a refugee. 
There is universal agreement that sovereign countries generally have free 
reign to enter agreements binding them to the negotiated terms.89 A state could, for 
example, agree to have a certain segment of its international economic disputes 
resolved by arbitrators.90 Similarly, a nation could enter a treaty such as NATO 
with the promise that it would come to the defense of an ally if attacked.91 These 
are clear cases of states surrendering a portion of their sovereignty. In this same 
fashion, states that ratified the Refugee Convention bound themselves to uphold its 
terms to treat refugees in certain specified ways.92 However, this point only takes 
us so far; the obvious next question is what have the signatories given up? The 
answer to this question is difficult, but it is the heart of the matter. 
To be sure, there is no problem with states expanding upon the list of groups 
that can be considered refugees, so long as the beneficiaries are outside of their 
home country. While the Convention definition mandates that persecution based on 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or social group are grounds for 
refugeehood, many nations have added to this list. For example, two of the most 
notable expansions have been put forth by the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) in 196993 and numerous Central American countries in the Cartagena 
Declaration in 1984.94 The OAU Convention reaffirms the original definition put 
forth in the 1951 Convention,95 but goes on to state that “the term refugee shall also 
apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order [and] is compelled to leave 
his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his 
country of origin.”96 Following the African Convention, Latin American 
                                                          
 
89 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 6, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
90 See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. III, ¶ 3, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
91 See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, art. 3, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
92 See generally Refugee Convention, supra note 10. 
93 Organization of African Unity, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter OAU Convention]. 
94 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in 
Central America, Mexico and Panama, Nov. 22, 1984, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1, at 
190–93 [hereinafter Cartagena Declaration]. 
95 See generally OAU Convention, supra note 93, at art. 1, ¶ 1. 
96 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
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signatories to the Cartagena Declaration expanded their refugee definition to 
include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom 
have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal 
conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have 
seriously disturbed public order.”97 Clearly, many nations have wisely chosen to 
broaden the scope of refugee protections to groups not initially covered by the 1951 
definition. It deserves mentioning, however, that neither of these progressive 
definitions of refugeehood went so far as to eliminate the alienage requirement. 
Does (42)(B) follow along in the footsteps of the OAU Convention and the 
Cartagena Declaration? Intuitively, one might say that yes, the U.S. law is similar 
to these other documents because it merely expands upon the circle of people who 
are allowed to seek refugee status. In this respect, the alienage exception law 
certainly is in line with these past examples. However, in dismissing the 
territoriality element, (42)(B) is indisputably different from its predecessors in one 
critical way. The expansion of protected groups who are already outside of their 
home country has, by virtue of geographic location, rendered the non-intervention 
question moot.98 Therefore, it is problematic to end the inquiry here, as the 
precedent of other expansions of the refugee definition is not analogous. 
Given the ambiguity of the Convention definition, the first place to look for 
clarification is elsewhere in the Convention. Relevant to this inquiry, Article 38 
unequivocally establishes the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the final arbiter 
of disputes about the “[Refugee] Convention relating to its interpretation or 
application.”99 Therefore, an ICJ opinion on the territoriality question would indeed 
be a helpful, if not entirely determinative, resolution to the ambiguity. 
Unfortunately, since no state has brought this matter to the attention of the ICJ, 
there has been no opportunity to do so.100 
However, in a case pre-dating the Refugee Convention by less than one year, 
the ICJ issued a remarkably clear and pertinent statement. The case dealt with the 
granting of asylum to an individual who had not yet fled his home country and 
                                                          
 
97 Cartagena Declaration, supra note 94, at Part III, ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 
98 See, e.g., Goodwin-Gill, supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
99 Refugee Convention, supra note 10, at art. 38. 
100 See Walter Kälin, Supervising the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Article 35 and 
Beyond, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 613, 655 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003). 
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whether this action was a violation of sovereignty. Ruling in 1950 in Asylum Case 
(Colombia v. Peru) the court said: 
In the case of diplomatic asylum, the refugee is within the territory of the State 
where the offence was committed. A decision to grant diplomatic asylum 
involves a derogation from the sovereignty of that State. It withdraws the 
offender from the jurisdiction of the territorial State and constitutes an 
intervention in matters which are exclusively within the competence of that 
State.101 
The 1950 ruling falls in line with arguments already provided within this 
article that the granting of refugee status to internal refugees constitutes 
intervention. As enlightening as this statement may be on the position of the ICJ, it 
must be acknowledged that because it was not made in regard to the Refugee 
Convention, it has no bearing on the final treaty interpretation. Thus, the ICJ’s 
statement is certainly persuasive but not determinative. 
In the absence of an explicit ICJ ruling or opinion, Article 42, the derogation 
clause of the Refugee Convention, may provide some additional guidance. This 
article restricts the terms of the Convention upon which a signatory state may make 
a reservation.102 A reservation allows the signatory to opt out of or alter a provision 
of a treaty or convention while otherwise remaining party to the document.103 In 
this case, Article 42 expressly forbids any reservation to Article 1, which includes 
the refugee definition.104 This can be interpreted as supporting the position that the 
territoriality element of the definition may not be cast aside. In light of the 
seemingly plain language mandating alienage, and the non-derogable nature of that 
stipulation, there is support to show that the territoriality clause is a critical element 
to the refugee definition. 
The position that the terms of the refugee definition are merely a baseline 
from which it may be expanded is perhaps most forcefully rebuked by examining 
the relevant legislative history. During the Convention’s drafting process the 
territoriality element was discussed on several occasions. The comments made at 
those times evidence the conscious and deliberate exclusion of internal refugees 
                                                          
 
101 Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 274–75 (Nov. 20) (emphasis added). 
102 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “derogation clause”). 
103 Id. 
104 Refugee Convention, supra note 10, at art. 42. 
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from the Convention. At one point in the process, the Greek delegate specifically 
inquired about the impact that the Refugee Convention would have on the 
internally displaced population within his country.105 Mrs. Roosevelt, in her 
capacity as delegate of the United States, responded with the following: 
All credit was due to the governments which bore the heavy burdens of those 
moves of people unilaterally, but those problems should not be confused with the 
problem before the General Assembly, namely, the provision of protection for 
those outside their own countries, who lacked the protection of a Government 
and who required asylum and status in order that they might rebuild lives of self-
dependence and dignity.106 
It was not just the United States that took this position however. In subsequent 
discussions, the French delegate, Mr. Rochefort, stated that: 
Whatever [definitional] formula might ultimately be chosen, it would not and 
could not in any event apply to internal refugees who were citizens of a 
particular country and enjoyed the protection of the government of that country. 
There was no general definition covering such refugees, since any such 
definition would involve an infringement of national sovereignty.107 
If that were not explicit enough, in explaining the drafting process a year 
later, Mr. Rochefort stated bluntly that “[i]t was certain that the United Nations did 
not intend to apply the provisions of the Convention to national [domestic] 
refugees.”108 These statements could not be clearer. 
We can say with a great deal of certainty that at least some of the most 
influential states that crafted the Refugee Convention in 1951 did so with the 
express understanding that the territoriality element was an outer limit to the 
reaches of the refugee definition. To these drafters, a refugee must be outside of 
their home country. It was not a bare minimum; it was the furthest that the 
                                                          
 
105 See UNGAOR, 4th Sess., Third Committee, Summary Records, 110 (1949). 
106 Id. (emphasis added). 
107 HATHAWAY, supra note 56, at 31 n.14 (quoting Statement of Mr. Rochefort of France, UN DOC. 
E/AC.7/SR.172, at 4 (Aug. 12, 1950)) (emphasis added). 
108 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 24th mtg., July 17, 
1951, Summary Record of the Twenty-fourth Meeting, at 4, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.2/SR.24 (Nov. 27, 
1951). 
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sovereign states were willing to go. To the extent that there were delegates who 
sought to push further on this point and eliminate the alienage element, there 
remained “anxiety that any attempt to respond to the needs of internal refugees 
would constitute an infringement of the national sovereignty of the state within 
which the refugee resided.”109 Under this argument, state sovereignty and 
international law constrain international actors and foreign states from applying 
refugee status to individuals who remain within their home country. 
In response to the overarching question then of whether states party to the 
Refugee Convention intended to sign away their right to non-intervention regarding 
internal refugees, the short answer is that they did not. The language of the 
Convention itself, the interpretations by academics and the ICJ, and the statements 
of the drafters of the Refugee Convention all provide firm basis for this position. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS: LIMITS OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
This section seeks to provide some guidance on what role the alienage 
exception law might have in light of the constraints of international law. There are 
several possible answers to this question. 
A. Agreement of Foreign States 
Since the main obstacle to the purposed of (42)(B) is the principle of state 
sovereignty, the most obvious and acceptable way around this is to obtain the 
permission of a target state to apply protections to internal refugees. While the use 
of the alienage exception law as a political tool to disparage another state may be 
resisted by that state, it is not always the case that animosity between governments 
necessarily prohibits cooperation on some issues. For example, following an influx 
of refugees from Cuba into the United States in 1965, Fidel Castro permitted these 
refugees to briefly return to the island so they could retrieve their relatives and take 
them back to the U.S.110 In this case, the in-country processing of refugees would 
not violate the sovereignty of Cuba because the government willingly put that issue 
aside. Similar programs have occurred at various times in Vietnam regarding the 
children of Vietnamese mothers and American soldiers born during the Vietnam 
War.111 
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110 Raufer, supra note 37, at 246. 
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A similar willingness to permit the in-country processing of refugees may be 
found in so-called “friendly” governments. Iraq is currently listed in the 2011 
Presidential Determination despite repeated attempts of the U.S. to characterize the 
government as successful and legitimate.112 For whatever reason, whether it be a 
humanitarian concern for its own people or an interest in resolving its own 
displacement issues, Iraq’s acquiescence to the executive decision would remove 
any perceived violation of their sovereignty. 
In these scenarios, (42)(B) does not violate international law, and no conflict 
between the 1980 Refugee Act and international law exists. In this regard, the ideal 
approach to address the internal refugee situation, and IDP issues more generally, is 
through the establishment of a new international convention. Something akin to 
Refugee Convention should be drafted, debated, and ultimately ratified so that the 
victims of persecution may obtain heightened protections from suffering at the 
hands of their own government. 
B. Human Security and Re-envisioning State Sovereignty 
A second argument, one far more controversial, is that the exercise of the 
alienage exception law may be proper when a government is not upholding its 
responsibilities as a sovereign state. This argument is built upon the extraordinary 
progress of the international human rights and human security movements. These 
schools of thought propose a conceptualization of state sovereignty that does not 
provide a nation carte blanche to abuse and persecute its citizens.113 Rather, 
sovereignty is understood as a conditional privilege that can be forfeited by a state 
as a result of its actions.114 The benefits of state sovereignty, including the right of 
non-intervention, are existentially bound to the willingness of the government to 
respect the basic rights of its citizens, chief among them the right to be free from 
persecution.115 
Under this paradigm, (42)(B) could properly be applied to any state engaged 
in systematic violation of the basic freedoms of its people. For example, the 
conditions in Darfur throughout much of the last decade, the wide-scale arrest and 
                                                          
 
112 Presidential Determination No. 2009-32, supra note 53. 
113 SHAHRBANOU TADJBAKHSH & ANURADHA M. CHENOY, HUMAN SECURITY: CONCEPTS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 190 (2007). 
114 Id. 
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detention of political dissidents in North Korea,116 or the mass violence brought to 
bear against civilians in Syria by their own government117 may be grounds for 
dismissing those governments’ claims to non-intervention. There is no sovereign 
right to persecute people. Under this human security framework, the provision of 
refugee status to this these groups would not constitute a violation of the non-
intervention principle. 
There are problems with this approach however. International human rights 
law and human security have not obtained wide acceptance within international 
law. The rights and duties approach to state sovereignty was not contemplated by 
the ICJ when it said that the provision of asylum to an internal refugee constituted a 
“derogation from the sovereignty of that State.”118 Moreover, this school of thought 
is still young and lacks broad consensus in many key areas. For instance, it remains 
unclear what forms of abuse or how many instances of persecution are necessary 
before a government should lose its claim to non-intervention. While these issues 
certainly plague this human security approach to refugee law today, the steady 
advancement and wider acceptance of these principles will only serve to strengthen 
this argument in the coming years. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At first glance, it may seem non-contentious that the United States has the 
authority to decide to whom it will offer assistance and immigration status as a 
refugee. In one way, this appears to be a purely domestic matter that is well within 
the right of any sovereign state to decide. However, as this article seeks to 
demonstrate, such an action has long been understood as a violation of the principle 
of non-intervention in international law. This is the position expressed by the 
International Court of Justice, international institutions such as the Council of 
Europe, the drafters of the Refugee Convention, and respected academics in the 
field. The United States sought to bypass international law through the Refugee Act 
of 1980. With this law, the U.S. unilaterally chooses foreign countries which will 
no longer be provided the right to non-intervention as to the relationship between 
that government and its citizens. 
                                                          
 
116 See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2009 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Mar. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/135995.htm. 
117 See, e.g., Press Statement, Sec. of State Hillary R. Clinton, Sharp Escalation of Regime Violence in 
Syria (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/01/182720.htm. 
118 Raufer, supra note 37, at 246 (quoting Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 274–75 
(Nov. 20)). 
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The principle of non-intervention is incorporated in the Refugee Convention’s 
definition of ‘refugee’ by the territoriality requirement. Despite the fact that many 
countries have expanded the conditions upon which refugee status may be 
conferred, these countries have retained the alienage requirement. This is critically 
important because once the individual has left his or her home country, the non-
intervention principle no longer applies to refugee status conferred on that person. 
This is the fundamental problem the alienage exception law runs into; it expands 
refugee protections beyond the limits set by international law and the Refugee 
Convention in particular. As a result, the way in which (42)(B) is exercised should 
be conformed to comply with the dictates of international law. Only where the 
internal refugees’ government has acquiesced to their inclusion in the Presidential 
Determination may refugee status be granted properly. Refugeehood, and the 
benefits incumbent with that status, goes a long way toward protecting and 
enabling victims of abhorrent persecution, but it can only go so far. Under 
international law today, for better or worse, internally displaced persons must cross 
the border to be refugees. 
